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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Leroy Lee appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to 
strike surplus language declaring him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer 
watch" by the authorities from the judgment of acquittal ordered to be entered by the 
Idaho Supreme Court following its decision in State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559 (2012). On 
appeal, Mr. Lee maintains that the district court acted without subject matter jurisdiction 
in declaring him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the authorities 
and thereby erred in denying his motion to strike. He further asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike when it added the language in 
violation of Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c), and that it deprived him of his right to procedural 
due process when it found him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by 
the authorities without providing him with notice of its intent to do so or an opportunity to 
be heard on the issue. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In its decision in Mr. Lee's favor in State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559 (2012), the Idaho 
Supreme Court ordered the district court to issue a judgment of acquittal upon remand, 
specifically providing, "This Court vacates the district court's Amended Judgment of 
Conviction, and remands this case with instructions for the entry of a judgment of 
acquittal." Lee, 153 Idaho at 563. On remand, the district court issued a Judgment of 
Acquittal After Remittitur, the body of which reads as follows: 
The defendant was convicted after a trial by jury of the offense of Failing 
to Register as a Sex Offender. He registered in Idaho, cut off his ankle 
monitor and fled and was eventually located in Belize after traveling in the 
United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by its Opinion 
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No. 38 filed June 29, 2011. The Supreme Court overturned that decision 
by its Opinion No. 109 filed July 5, 2012. Based upon the Supreme 
Court's decision and a remittitur having entered, the verdict of the jury is 
vacated and a judgment of acquittal is entered. Because he is a serious 
pedophile, it is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a closer 
watch on him in the future. As mandated, a judgment of acquittal is 
entered. 
It is so ordered. 
(40330 R., p.? (emphasis added).) 
Trial counsel for Mr. Lee then filed a Motion to Strike Surplusage in Judgment of 
Acquittal After Remittitur, seeking to have the language declaring Mr. Lee a "serious 
pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the authorities stricken from the judgment of 
acquittal. (40330 R., pp.8-14.) The district court, appears to have written in the margin 
of the Motion, "What good name?" The district court's marginalia was in response to 
the argument that, "This Court, in labeling Mr. Lee a 'serious pedophile' attached a 
badge of infamy to him and called into question his good name, reputation, honor, and 
integrity without providing him notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard" in 
violation of his due process rights. (40330 R., P 14.) 
The primary arguments advanced in the Motion to Strike were that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the finding of fact that Mr. Lee was "a 
serious pedophile" for whom "it is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a closer 
watch on him in the future," and abused its discretion in adding the findings of fact 
because it lacked authority under Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c) to do so. (40330 R., pp.9-
13.) 
Ultimately, the district court denied the Motion, reasoning, 
The Court entered the Judgment of Acquittal as required by the remittitur. 
He prevailed on appeal because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the statute but after he had been sentenced, after he had a presentence 
report prepared and he had been given an opportunity to challenge all the 
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information contained in that report so he was afforded due process. He 
is subject to a duty to register which pre-existed this case. Presumably, 
the Parole Board will have access to all of the information generated as a 
result of the defendant's prior offenses. The record is abundantly clear 
that the defendant is a risk to children. The Motion to Strike is denied. 
(40330 R., p.16.) Nowhere in its order did the district court address Mr. Lee's primary 
arguments concerning the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction or authority 
under Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c) to make findings of fact or do anything other than 
enter a judgment of acquittal on remand (40330 R., p.16.) 
Mr. Lee filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's order denying his 
motion to strike. (40330, p.17.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lee's motion to strike surplus 
language declaring him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by 
the authorities from the judgment of acquittal because, under the language of the 
remittitur, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make such factual findings? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Lee's motion to strike 
surplus language declaring him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer 
watch" by the authorities from the judgment of acquittal because, in doing so, it 
failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable on remand? 
3. Did the district court violate Mr. Lee's right to procedural due process when, 
without notice or a hearing, it declared him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of 
"closer watch" by the authorities? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lee's Motion To Strike Surplus Language 
Declaring Him To Be "A Serious Pedophile" In Need Of "Closer Watch" By The 
Authorities From The Judgment Of Acquittal Because, Under The Language Of The 
Remittitur, It Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Make Such Factual Findings 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Lee asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to strike 
surplus language from the judgment of acquittal because, under the language of the 
remittitur, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make such factual findings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Issues about the district court's jurisdiction are issues of law over which the 
[Idaho Supreme] Court exercises independent review." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 
227 (2004). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lee's Motion To Strike Surplus 
Language Declaring Him To Be "A Serious Pedophile" In Need Of "Closer 
Watch" By The Authorities From The Judgment Of Acquittal Because, Under The 
Language Of The Remittitur, It Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Make Such 
Factual Findings 
In Rogers, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, 
"Jurisdiction over the subject matter" has been variously defined as 
referring to (1) the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; 
(2) the class of cases to which the particular one belongs and the nature 
of the relief sought; (3) the power of a court to hear and determine cases 
of the general class to which the particular one belongs; (4) both the class 
of cases and the particular subject matter involved; and (5) the 
competency of the court to hear and decide the case. 
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228. 
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While an order remanding a case to the district court can confer subject matter 
jurisdiction to take actions directed by the appellate court, the degree to which 
jurisdiction is conferred is entirely dependent upon the nature of the appellate court's 
directive. "The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions 
it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by 
the appellate court." State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886 (2000) (citing Walters v. 
Industriallndem. Co., 130 Idaho 836,838 (1997)). No subsidiary issues arise in cases 
in which the only action required is a ministerial act, such as entering an amended 
judgment. Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 833 (1999). In Walters, the Idaho 
Supreme Court quoted the following from its opinion in Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. 
Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737 (1921): 
The mandate of the reviewing court is binding upon the lower court, and 
must be strictly followed. Where the appellate court remands a cause with 
directions to enter judgment for one of the parties, the judgment of the 
appellate court is a final judgment in the cause, and the entry thereof in 
the lower court is a purely ministerial act. ... A trial court has no authority 
to enter any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the 
appellate court. That order is conclusive on the parties, and no judgment 
or order different from or in addition to that directed by it can have any 
effect. ... No modification of the judgment so directed can be made by the 
trial court, nor can any provision be ingrafted on or taken from it. 
Walters, 130 Idaho at 837 -38 (ellipses in original) (quoting Mountain Home Lumber Co., 
33 Idaho at 740-41). 
In Mr. Lee's case, the district court was ordered to perform a purely ministerial 
act, namely, entering a judgment of acquittal for the charge of failing to register as a sex 
offender. Nowhere in the grant of limited jurisdiction contained in the Idaho Supreme 
Court's remittitur did it indicate that the district court should provide any opinion as to 
Mr. Lee, let alone proclaim him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by 
the authorities. Such language was entirely unnecessary to performance of the 
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ministerial act, and as such, the objectionable language was added without subject 
matter jurisdiction. Therefore, denial of Mr. Lee's motion to strike the unlawfully-added 
language was erroneous. In light of this error, Mr. Lee respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion to strike, and remand this 
matter for entry of an order striking the offending language from the Judgment of 
Acquittal After Remittitur. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Lee's Motion To Strike 
Surplus Language Declaring Him To Be "A Serious Pedophile" In Need Of "Closer 
Watch" By The Authorities From The Judgment Of Acquittal Because, In Doing So, It 
Failed To Act Consistently With The Legal Standards Applicable On Remand 
A. Introduction 
The district court acted outside the bounds of its legal authority when it made 
findings of fact that Mr. Lee was "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the 
authorities in the judgment of acquittal ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court because, in 
doing so, it failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable on remand. As 
such, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Lee's Motion to Strike 
Surplusage in Judgment of Acquittal After Remittitur. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a trial court's discretionary decision on appeal, the appellate 
court considers: (1) whether the district court perceived that the issue was one of 
discretion; (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of that discretion and consistently 
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether its decision was reached by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (citation omitted). 
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C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Lee's Motion To 
Strike Surplus Language Declaring Him To Be "A Serious Pedophile" In Need Of 
"Closer Watch" By The Authorities From The Judgment Of Acquittal Because, In 
Doing So, It Failed To Act Consistently With The Legal Standards Applicable On 
Remand 
Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c) provides: 
When the opinion filed has become final in accordance with this rule, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a remittitur with the district 
court or administrative agency appealed from and mail copies to a/l parties 
to the appeal and to the presiding district judge or chairman of the agency. 
The remittitur shall advise the district court or administrative agency that 
the opinion has become final and that the district court or administrative 
agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion. 
I.A.R. 38(c) (emphasis added). 
Nowhere in the remittitur issued by the Idaho Supreme Court did the Court direct 
the district court to do anything other than enter a judgment of acquittal, let alone make 
findings of fact concerning whether Mr. Lee is "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer 
watch" by the authorities. (Remittitur.)1 
Because the district court's initial action in adding surplus language to the 
judgment of acquittal exceeded the bounds of the limited legal authority conferred by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in the remittitur and constituted a failure to act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards contained in Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c), it abused its 
discretion when it denied Mr. Lee's Motion to Strike. Mr. Lee respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion to strike, and remand this 
matter to the district court for entry of an order striking the offending language from the 
Judgment of Acquittal After Remittitur. 
1 Contemporaneously with this Brief, Mr. Lee has filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of the 
remittitur issued by the Idaho Supreme Court in the opinion underlying this appeal. 
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III. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Lee's Right To Procedural Due Process When, Without 
Notice Or A Hearing, It Declared Him To Be "A Serious Pedophile" In Need Of "Closer 
\J\Jatch" By The Authorities 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court rejects the arguments set forth in Parts I and 
II, supra, Mr. Lee asserts that the district court violated his right to procedural due 
process when it declared him to be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by 
the authorities. 
Procedural due process "requires that a person, whose protected rights are being 
adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner. There must be 
notice and the opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner." Ada County Hwy. Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 
Idaho 360, 371 (2008) (citations omitted). 
In Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court considered 
the due process concerns surrounding a then-existing statute providing for the 
designation, under certain circumstances, of an individual convicted of sex offenses as 
a Violent Sexual Predator (hereinafter, VSP).2 Under the statutory scheme, those for 
whom a VSP designation was sought were not entitled to provide input to the Sex 
Offender Classification Board, nor were they given notice of the information being 
considered or the opportunity to be heard as to the reliability of the information. Smith, 
146 Idaho at 826. 
In finding the VSP statute unconstitutional, the Court cited the lack of procedural 
due process protections, noting, "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
2 The statute has since been repealed. 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 311, § 20. 
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opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U S. 433, 437 (1971 )).3 The Court continued quoting Constantineau as follows, 
"[C]ertainly where the State attaches a 'badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process 
comes into play." Id. (brackets in original). The Idaho Supreme Court explained, "We 
take it as a given that the label of 'violent sexual predator' is a 'badge of infamy' that 
necessitates due process protections." Id. 
As in Smith, the district court placed a "badge of infamy" upon Mr. Lee. More 
troubling than the scenario found unconstitutional by the Court in Smith, the district 
court here had no statutory authority to so label Mr. Lee; it simply chose to attach such 
a label gratuitously and without notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
The district court's reasoning in its order denying his motion to strike, that "he 
was afforded due process" because its factual findings were based on information 
contained in the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) prepared following 
his wrongful conviction is erroneous because, even assuming that the opportunity to 
contest the contents of a PSI satisfied the due process right to challenge the accuracy 
of the underlying information, the court's order does not address the separate 
requirements that Mr. Lee be afforded notice of its intent to find him to be "a serious 
pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the authorities and a hearing on its intent to do 
so. 
Having deprived Mr. Lee of the requisite notice and the opportunity for a hearing, 
the district court violated his procedural due process rights. As such, Mr. Lee 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion 
3 Constantineau concerned a Wisconsin statute providing for the designation of an 
individual as a "habitual drunkard." Id. 
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to strike, and remand this matter to the district court for entry of an order striking the 
offending language from the Judgment of Acquittal After Remittitur. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Lee respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's order denying his motion to strike, and remand this matter for 
entry of an order striking the offending language from the Judgment of Acquittal After 
Remittitur. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2013. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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